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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 14-1431
___________
DR. SUBRINA TAYLOR,
Appellant
v.
HARRISBURG AREA COMMUNITY COLLEGE
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1:12-cv-00169)
District Judge: Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
August 18, 2014
Before: CHAGARES, KRAUSE and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: August 19, 2014)
___________
OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM
Dr. Subrina Taylor, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s order
granting Defendant/Appellee Harrisburg Area Community College’s (“HACC”) motion
for summary judgment in Taylor’s employment discrimination lawsuit. Taylor’s briefs in

support of her appeal indicate that she also seeks review of the District Court’s orders (1)
deeming the HACC’s summary judgment motion unopposed, (2) considering her
amended motion to reconsider as the sole motion to reconsider, and (3) denying her
motion to reconsider the order deeming the summary judgment order unopposed. We will
affirm the District Court’s orders.
I. BACKGROUND
In 1993,Taylor, an African-American female, began working as a
counselor/coordinator of special needs students at HACC. At the time of her 2007
resignation, she had been the Dean of Enrollment Services since 2003. Although Taylor
received positive reviews for several years, by 2005 her evaluations reflected that she had
problems in major areas of her job performance. In 2006, Taylor applied for the position
of Vice President of Student Affairs. She was one of five people selected for on-campus
interviews, but Dr. Winifred Black, a Caucasian female, was selected for the position
“based on there being many strengths and ‘very few weaknesses’” compared to Taylor.
In October 2006, Taylor filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”), claiming that she was not promoted due to her race. While the
parties were engaged in settlement negotiations, Taylor accepted an offer with Bunker
Hill Community College in Massachusetts, which she concealed from HACC. When
HACC found out that Taylor had accepted another job, it terminated settlement
negotiations.
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Taylor’s contract at Bunker Hill Community College was not renewed, and in
2009, the Vice President of Student Affairs position at HACC opened again. Taylor once
more applied for the position, and was one of five applicants provided to the search
committee for further consideration. HACC did not, however, give Taylor an on-campus
interview because HACC’s president did not trust her, due in large part to Taylor’s
actions during the 2007 negotiations. Soon thereafter, Taylor filed her second EEOC
charge. She alleged that she was not hired for the vice president position due to her race,
and that HACC’s decision not to hire her was in retaliation for her filing of the 2006
EEOC charge.
In January 2012, after receiving right-to-sue letters from the EEOC, Taylor
commenced this lawsuit in the Middle District of Pennsylvania. Taylor filed her original
complaint pro se, and alleged that HACC violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, by discriminating against her based on her race when it did not
promote her in 2006 or re-hire her in 2010. She also claimed that HACC retaliated
against her based on her filing the 2006 EEOC charge in connection with her failure to be
rehired in 2010.
The procedural background of this matter is confusing at best. However, after
HACC’s motion to dismiss was fully briefed, Taylor retained an attorney, who filed an
amended complaint. The parties engaged in several months of discovery, and HACC
moved for summary judgment in October 2013. Taylor sought and received several
extensions to respond to the summary judgment motion. The District Court’s order
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granting the final request for an extension provided that the response to the summary
judgment motion was due on December 2, 2013. Taylor still did not respond.
Accordingly, on January 3, 2014, the District Court granted the HACC’s motion to deem
the summary judgment motion unopposed pursuant to Local Rules 7.6 and 56.1.
On January 6, 2014, Taylor filed a pro se motion for reconsideration, which the
District Court struck from the record because she was represented. On January 7, 2014,
Taylor’s attorney filed a motion to withdraw his representation and a motion for
reconsideration on behalf of Taylor. The same day, Taylor filed another pro se motion for
reconsideration of the January 3, 2014 order. On January 27, 2014, the District Court
granted Taylor’s attorney’s motion to withdraw, and entered an order deeming moot the
attorney’s motion for reconsideration as superseded by Taylor’s January 7th pro se
motion.
Taylor’s motion for reconsideration was based on her former attorney’s alleged
“egregious neglect and willful mishandling” of the case, as well as “collusion” with
HACC’s counsel. The District Court denied the motion, declining to find that Taylor’s
“negligent failure to respond to Defendant’s motion was excusable or that extraordinary
circumstances exist to warrant the court’s reconsideration of its January 3, 2014 order. . .
.” Moreover, the court rejected as “entirely unsupported” Taylor’s “vague and summary
reference to what can only be described as a malevolent conspiracy by her counsel to
affirmatively violate his ethical duty and get the case dismissed.”
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The next day, the District Court entered an order granting HACC’s summary
judgment motion. In the accompanying memorandum opinion, the District Court
concluded that Taylor did not establish a prima facie case under the three-step burdenshifting test set forth by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). After
thoroughly considering the evidence, the District Court determined that Taylor failed to
present any evidence that HACC’s hiring decisions were racially motivated. Moreover,
even assuming that Taylor could establish a prima facie case, the District Court found
that HACC offered “legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for not promoting [Taylor] in
2006 and not rehiring her in 2010, namely that [she] was not the most qualified person
for the position.” The District Court concluded that Taylor had “set forth no basis on
which a jury could find that Defendant’s proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for not hiring her was pretext for racial discrimination.”
The District Court also determined that Taylor had not established a prima facie
case of retaliation under Title VII based on HACC’s failure to rehire her in 2010. The
District Court stated that it was “not presented with any evidence that the temporal
proximity between protected activity [filing the 2006 EEOC charge] and the adverse
employment action was unusually suggestive of retaliatory motive.” Further, there was
no evidence “involving a pattern of antagonism regarding” Taylor’s filing of the 2006
EEOC charge. The District Court stated that “[f]inally, when taken as a whole, the
evidence certainly does not support the inference of causation. Rather, the record
establishes that [Taylor’s] performance . . . was less than stellar,” and that Taylor’s
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“decision to mislead Defendant during the settlement negotiations was the reason
[HACC’s president] lost trust and confidence in [Taylor] and justifiably did not want
[Taylor] in her cabinet.”
Taylor now appeals.
II. DISCUSSION
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise
plenary review over the District Court’s decision granting summary judgment, using the
same standard applied by the District Court. See Doe v. Luzerne Cnty., 660 F.3d 169,
174 (3d Cir. 2011).
Taylor seeks review of the District Court’s January 3, 2014 order deeming
HACC’s motion for summary judgment motion unopposed, and the January 29, 2014
order denying her motion to reconsider that order. The District Court did not err. The
motion for summary judgment was, in fact, unopposed, as no response brief was filed,
and Local Rules7.6 and 56.1 gave the District Court the power to deem the summary
judgment motion as uncontested. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183, 191 (2010)
(stating that district courts have discretion to adopt local rules, which have the “force of
law”).
Taylor also asserts that the District Court erred in denying her motion to
reconsider the order deeming the summary judgment motion unopposed. We disagree. 1
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While the District Court should not have based its decision to deny the motion to
reconsider on Rule 60, which applies only to final judgments, we find that it was
harmless error because under any applicable standard there was no merit in Taylor’s
6

The District Court properly concluded that Taylor’s failure to respond to the summary
judgment motion, after seeking and receiving four extensions of time to do so, did not
justify modification of its order, especially where Taylor demonstrated a pattern of
disregard for the court’s rules. Additionally, as the District Court explained, Taylor’s
counsel did not abandon her. Rather, “the email exchanges [between Taylor and counsel]
show that [Taylor] was not only well apprised of the deadlines, but that she and [her]
Attorney. . . were in communication regarding the extended deadlines and the need to file
a response to Defendant’s motion for summary judgment.” Accordingly, for this and the
other reasons explained by the District Court, it did not err in declining to modify the
order deeming the summary judgment motion unopposed. We will therefore sustain the
District Court’s order.
As to the decision granting the HACC’s motion for summary judgment, the
District Court conducted a thorough review of the record and issued a detailed and cogent
opinion discussing Taylor’s claims. For essentially the reasons stated by the District
Court, we agree that HACC was entitled to summary judgment. We have considered
Taylor’s arguments on appeal, and conclude that she has not directed us to any error that
undermines our confidence in the District Court’s decision. We agree with the District
Court that Appellant failed to come forth with evidence establishing genuine issues of
material fact with respect to her claims.

challenge to the order. See Farr Man & Co., Inc. v. M/V Rozita, 901 F.2d 871, 874-75
(1st Cir. 1990).
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Finally, we note that the Taylor’s appellate briefs concentrate on her argument that
the District Court’s summary judgment decision should be vacated due to alleged “fraud
on the court.” In support of this claim, she has attached several documents that were not
part of the District Court record and that we will therefore disregard. Further, a Rule
60(d)(5) motion for relief from judgment due to fraud on the court may only be brought
before the District Court. We thus lack the authority to consider Taylor’s request that the
District Court’s order and memorandum granting the HACC’s summary judgment motion
be vacated due to fraud on the court. 2
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm each of the District Court’s orders from
which Taylor has appealed.
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Taylor cites no relevant authority—and we are aware of none—that supports her
proposition that the District Court erred by ordering that her former counsel’s motion for
reconsideration was moot and that it was superseded by her pro se motion for
reconsideration. Accordingly, we will not disturb the District Court’s January 7, 2014
order.
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